As probabilistic systems gain popularity and are coming into wider use, the need for a mechanism that explains the system's findings and recom mendations becomes more critical. The system will also need a mechanism for ordering compet ing explanations. We examine two representa tive approaches to explanation in the literature one due to Gardenfors and one due to Pearl-and show that both suffer from significant problems.
INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic inference is often hard for humans to under stand. Even a simple inference in a small domain may seem counterintuitive and surprising; the situation only gets worse for large and complex domains. Thus, a sys tem doing probabilistic inference must be able to explain its findings and recommendations to evoke confidence on the part of the user. Indeed, in experiments with medical diagnosis systems, medical students not only trusted the system more when presented with an explanation of the diagnosis, but also were more confident about disagreeing with it when the explanations did not account adequately for all of the aspects of the case (Suennondt and Cooper 1992). Explanation can also play an important role in refi n ing and debugging probabilistic systems. An incorrect or partially correct explanation should be the best indication to an expert of a potential problem.
Our goal is to find a notion of explanation in a probabilistic setting that can be usefully applied by a reasoning system to explain its findings to a human. Of course, we are not the first to examine explanation. It has been has analyzed by philosophers for many years. Traditionally, it has been modeled by introducing a deductive relation between the explanation and the fact to be explained (explanandum) (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) . While Henrion and Druzdzel 1990; Pearl 1988; Shimony 1991; Suermondt 1992) .) Since we are interested in explanation in probabilistic systems, our focus is on proposals that seek a probabilistic connection between the explanation and the explanandum. In the philosophical literature, the focus has been on the probability of the explanandum given the ex planation. The requirements range from just requiring that this conditional probability change, to requiring that it be very high, to requiring that it be greater than the uncon ditional probability of the explanandum (so that learning the explanation increases the probability of the explanan dum); see (Giirdenfors 1988; Salmon 1984) for discussion and further references. In contrast, the research on expla nation in Bayesian networks (Henrion and Druzdzel 1990; Pearl 1988; Shimony 1991) has concentrated on comput ing the conditional probability of the explanation given the explanandum, adding in some cases the additional require ment that the explanation be a complete world description.
Clearly the appropriateness of a notion of explanation will depend in large part on the intended application. A scientifi c explanation might well have different properties from an explanation provided by an intelligent tutoring system. In our intended application, the system will typically have some uncertainty regarding the true state of the world (and possibly even the domain's causal structure), represented as a probability distribution. Note that this is different from, say, an intelligent tutoring system, where we assume the system to have the full knowledge of the domain. For simplicity, we make the (admittedly unrealistic) assumption that the user's knowledge can be identified with the system's knowledge.1 Because we expect that there will typically be a number of competing explanations that can be provided to the user, we are interested not just in finding an absolute notion of explanation, but a comparative notion. We want to be able to judge when one explanation is better than another.
In this paper, we concentrate on two definitions of expla nation, one due to Gardenfors (I 988) and the other to Pearl (1988) , as representatives of the two approaches mentioned above. While, as we point out, there are significant prob lems with these definitions, we consider them because they have some important features that we feel should constitute part of an approach to defining explanation. We suggest an
approach that combines what we feel are the best features of these two definitions with some ideas from the more re cent work on causality (Balke and Pearll994; Druzdzel and Simon 1993; Beckerman and Shachter 1995; Pearl 1995) .
One of the observations that falls naturally out of our ap proach is that we should expect different answers depending on whether we are asking for an explanation of beliefs or facts. For example, if the agent believes that it rained last night and we ask for an explanation for this belief, then a perfe ctly reasonable explanation is that he or she notic:OO the wet grass in the morning, which is correlated with rain. However, if the agent observes that it is raining and we ask for the best explanation of this observation, then it would certainly not be satisfactory to be told that the grass is wet.
We do not accept the wet grass as an expl anation in the second case because the wet grass is not a cause of rain. However, we would accept it in the first case because the agent believing that the grass is wet is a cause of the agent believing that it rained. The critical difference between ex planations of beliefs and explanations of observations does not seem to have been discussed before in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we present and analyze Gardenfors' and Pearl's defi nitions. In Section 4 we present a new approach which generalizes elements of both. We conclude with some open problems in Section 5.
GARDENFORS' APPROACH

THE DEFINITION
As we suggested earlier, roughly speaking, for Gardenfors, X is an explanation of E if Pr(EIX) > Pr(E). That is, X is an explanation of E if learning X raises the probability of E. In order to flesh out this intuition, we need to make precise what probability distribution we are using.
According to Gardenfors, what requires explanation is
something that is already known, but was unexpected : A person asking for an explanation expresses a "cognitive dis sonance" between the explanandum and the rest of his or her beliefs. We don't typically require an explanation for something we expected all along. The amount of disso nance is measured by the surprise value of the explanan dum in the belief state in which we reject our belief in the explanandum while holding as many as possible of our other beliefs intact (this operation is called contraction and comes from the belief revision framework (Alchourr6n, Gardenfors, and Makinson 1985) ). An explanation pro vides "cognitive relief"; the degree of "cognitive relief" is measured by the degree to which the explanation decreases the surprise value.
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For example, if we ask for an explanation of why David has the flu, then we already know that David has the flu. Thus, if E is the statement "David has the flu", then in the current situation, we already ascribe probability 1 to E.
Nothing that we could learn could increase that probability.
On the other hand, we presumably asked for an explanation we would only present the information about his profession.
To formalize these intuitions, Glirdenfors characterizes a (probabilistic) epistemic state using the possible worlds model. At any given time, an agent is assumed to con sider a number of worlds (or states of the world) possible. We can now present Giirdenfors' defi nition of explanation.
Definition 2.2 (from (Gll.rdenfors 1988)) X is an explana tion of E relative to a state of belief K = (W, Pr) (where
, and 2. Pr(X) < 1 (that is, X ¢. K).
We have already seen the first clause of this defi nition. Given this notion of explanation, we can define an ordering on explanations that takes into account the degree to which an explanation raises the probability of the explanandum.
Gardenfors in fact defined explanatory power as the dif ference between the posterior and prior probability of the explanandum. Thus, a better explanation is one with better explanatory power.
The difference is not always a good measure of distance between probabilities. An explanation which raises the probability of a statement of interest from 0.50000 l to 0.51
is not so powerful . On the other hand, an explanation raising the probability from 0.0000 01 to 0.01 would be received quite differently, although the difference in probabilities is the same. A more natural way to defi ne explanatory power is by using the ratio of the two probabilities.
Definition 2.3 The explanatory power (EP) of X with re spect to E is EP(X E) = Pr:E(EIX) .
' PrE(E)
According to this definition, the two explanations above have dramatically different explanatory power. For this paper, we take the latter definition as our formal definition of explanatory power.
Before we get to our critique of Gardenfors' defi nition, there is one other issue we need to discuss: the language in which explanations are given. Definition 2.3 makes per" feet sense if, for example, explanations are propositional formulas over a finite set of primitive propositions. In tha� case, a world w could be taken to be a truth assignment to a fi nite family of these primitive propositions. We could also take explanations to be first-order formulas, in which case a world could be taken to be a first -order interpretation. (Halpern 1990) , wbere a structure con sists of possible worlds, with a distribution over the worlds, and, in each world there is a distribution on the individuals in that world; a formal language is provided for reasoning about such models. If the domain is finite, we could sim plify things and assume that the distribution is the uniform distribution, as is done in (Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller 1996) .) While it is not necessary to consider such a rich language to make sense of Glirdenfors' definition, one of his key insights is that statistical assertions are an important component of explanations. Indeed, he explicitly describes an explanation as a conjunction xl 1\ x2. where X1 is a conjunction of statistical assertions and X2 is what
Glirdenfors calls a singular sentence, by which he means a Boolean combination of atomic sentences in a first-order language with only unary predicates. (Either conjunct may be omitted.) As we shall argue, we need to generalize this somewhat to allow causal assertions as well as statistical assertions.
A CRITIQUE
While Giirdenfors' definition has some compelling features (see (Glirdenfors 1988) for further discussion), it also has some serious problems, both practical and philosophical. We describe some of them in this section.
1. While the second clause prevents E from being an ex planation of itself, there are many other explanations that it does not block. Let F be any formula such that Pr(F) < 1 and Pr:g( E 1\ F) > 0. Then E 1\ F will be an explanation for E. Moreover, it will be the explanation with the highest possible explanatory power (both according to G�denfors' original defi nition and our modifi cation). This is obvious, since
Pr:g( EI E 1\ F) = 1. Note that F can be practically any formula here. We surely wouldn't want to accept "E and the coin lands heads" as an explanation for E.
One possible solution to this problem is to restrict ex planations to only involving certain propositions. For example, if we are looking for an explanation for some symptoms, we might require that the explanation be a disease. There are many cases where such restrictions make sense, but if we are to do this, then we mus� explain where the restrictions are coming from.
Even if we restrict attention to a particular vocabulary
for explanations, there is nothing preventing us from adding irr elevant conjuncts to an explanation. More precisely, note that if X is an explanation of E, and C is conditionally independent of E given X, then PrE:(EJX) = Pri(EJX A C). Thus, X and X A C are viewed as equally good explanations.
3. The definition does not take into account the likeli hood of the explanation. For example, suppose there are two explanations for a symptom s, disease d1 and disease d2, with the same explanatory power, but d1 is a relatively common disease, while d2 is quite rare. If the explanation is given by an expert that is trusted by the user (as in the case of an intelligent tutoring system), then once we are told that, say d2 is the ex planation. we would presumably accept it as true. In this case, the prior probability (i.e., the fact that d2 is rare) is irrelevant. However, in our context, even if
Pr; (sldt) = Pr; (s\d2), it seems clear that we should prefer the explanation dt to d2.
4.
The fact that learning X raises the probability of E does not by itself qualify X to be an explanation of E. Most of the work done on explanation in belief networks was based on the intuition that the best explanation for an observation is the state of the world that is most proba ble given the evidence (Henrion and Druzdzel 1990; Pearl 1988; Shimony 1991) . There is no notion of "cognitive dissonance" or surprise. The explanation is an (informed) guess about the possible world we are currently in, based on the evidence (which includes the explanandum). In some cases (e.g., (Pearl l988)), the guess must specify the world completely-formulas describing sets of worlds are not allowed as explanations. This approach, which we
call Maximum A Posteriori model {MAP) after (Shimony 1991 ) , has bee n also known under other names: Most Prob able Explanation (MPE) (Pearl1988) and Scenario-Based Explanation (Henrion and Druzdzell990).
Formally, according to Pearl, given an epistemic state Two other variants of the MAP approach have been pro posed, by Henrion and Druzdzel (1990) and Shimony (1991 Shimony ( , 1993 . They share with Pearl's definition two impor tant features: Ftrst, the explanation is a truth assigrunent to a subset of propositions, including the explanandum. Sec ond, the ordering of explanations is based on their posterior probability given the explanandum.
Henrion and Drozdzel actually discuss a number of ap proaches to explanation. Of most relevance here are what they call scenario-based explanations. They assume a tree of propositions (a scenario tree), where a path from the root to a leaf represents a scenario, or a sequence of events. They are looking for the scenario with the highest probabil ity given the explanandum.
4 Thus, their approach differs from Pearl's in that the system has additional knowledge (the scenarios). They also allow explanations to be partial.
The truth values of all propositions do not have to be spec ified. However, explanations are restricted to coming from a set of prespecified scenarios.
Shimony (1 991, 1993) also allows partial explanations. He works in the framework of Bayesian networks (as does Pearl, in fact, although his definition makes sense even if probabilities are not represented using Bayesian networks).5 In his framework, the explanandum is an in stantiation of (truth assignment to) some nodes in the net work; these are called the evidence nodes. An explanation is a truth assignment to the "relevant" nodes in the net work. The relevant nodes include the evidence nodes and only ancestors of evidence nodes can be relevant. Roughly speaking, an ancestor of a given node is irre levant if it has the property that it is independent of that node given the values of the other ancestors. In (Shimony 1991) , the best explanation is taken to be the one with the highest poste rior probability. In (Shimony 1993) , this is extended to allow explanations to be sets of partial truth assignments, subject to certain constraints (discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.)
A CRITIQUE
The MAP approach has an advantage over Gardenfors':
it doesn't require contraction. However, it has its own problems. Some of the problems are particularly acute in Pearl's approach, with its requirement that the explanation be complete; i.e., a world; they are alleviated somewhat if we allow partial explanations (sets of worlds). However, some of the problems arise in all variants of the approach, and are a consequence of ordering according to the posterior probability distribution.
1. By making the explanation a complete world, the no tion becomes very sensitive to the choice of language, as Pearl himself observes. 6 For example, if our lan guage consists of {s, d1, d2}, then the best explanation 4 Actually, they suggest presenting all scenarios that have suf ficiently high probability, and pointing out how the most probable one differs from the other likely scenarios.
5Recall that a Bayesian network is an acyclic directed graph whose nodes represent primitive propositions {or random vari ables), together with conditional probability tables describing the probability of a node given instantiations of its parents (Pearl 1988 ).
6Shimony (1991) calls this the over specification problem.
for symptoms might be d1, or, more precisely, the world characterized by s A d 1 A ...,d2. For the purposes of this example, suppose that diseases are mutually exclusive, so all worlds where the agent has more than one disease have probability 0. Now suppose we sub divide d1 into two diseases d� and d�', again mutually exclusive (as, for example, hepatitis can be subdivided into hepatitis A and hepatitis B). Then we might find d2 to be a better explanation than either d� or d� (that is, Pr( ·d� A ·d� A d2l s) may be greater than either Pr(d� A -.d'( A •d2ls) or Pr( ·d� Ad� A •d2ls )).
Pearl gives an even sharper example of this phe nomenon. Suppose that d1 is a a diagnosis of per fect health, d2 is a diagnosis of a fatal disease, Pr(dtls) = 0.8, and Pr(d2ls) = 0.2. Now suppose we expand the vocabulary to include h1, . . . , hs, where the hi's are possible holidays that the agent will take next year (provided he or she is indeed healthy), and the agent considers each of these vacation plans equally likely. Then we have that Pr( h; A dtl s) = 0.1, and the most likely explanation of the symptom has changed from d 1 to d2! So just by considering possible holidays he might take given that he is healthy, the agent finds that the best explanation for his symptoms becomes a fatal disease.
2. A related problem is the fact that if we have a large number of primitive propositions, most will probably be irr elevant or only marginally relevant to explaining a particular proposition. Yet, Pearl's definition forces us to consider worlds, thus forcing us to worry about the truth value of all propositions. This can cause computational problems. In addition, conciseness is a desirable feature in an explanation, particularly in an interactive system. The user usually wants to know only the most influential elements of the complete explanation, and does not want to be burdened with unn ecessary detail. This problem is particularly se vere if we insist on complete explanations. However, Shimony's partial explanations are not necessarily as concise as one would hope either. It is not hard to show that for each evidence node X, the explanation must include an assignment to all the nodes in at least one path from X to the root, since for each relevant node, at least one of its parents must be relevant Moreover, the irrelevance condition is quite strong and only in limited contexts is it likely to achieve significant prun ing. Shimony attempts to overcome this problem by relaxing the irrelevance assumption to what he calls approximate or 8-irr elevance. While helpful in some domains, the extent to which it will result in concise explanations in general is not clear. We discuss this point in more detail in the full paper.
3. The ordering on explanations used in the MAP ap proach is supposed to maximize the probability of the explanation given the explanandum. However, if we consider only explanations which include the explanandum (as all MAP explanations do), this re duces to maximizing the prior of the explanation. The ordering is then based only on the likelihood of the ex planation and not in any way on the degree to which the explanation raises the probability of the explanandum. Notice that a partial explanation is really a set of worlds (or equivalently, the disjunction of the formulas representing the worlds). But a disjunction will always have higher conditional probability than any of its disjuncts (except in the degenerate case where all but one of the disjuncts has probability 0), and thus will be viewed as a more probable explanation than any of its disjuncts. It is because of this that Shimony puts restrictions on the allowable partial explanations as well. As we shall see , we can deal with this problem, at least to some extent, by modifying the ordering of explanations.
All
SYNTHESIS
As we have seen, both Gardenfors' definition and the MAP definition have problems. We believe that in order to deal with these problems, we need to deal with two relatively orthogonal issues: (1) we must decide what counts as an explanation, and (2) we must decide how to compare two explanations.
WHAT COUNTS AS AN EXPLANATION?
The MAP approach seems somewhat too restrictive in what counts as an explanation: An explanation must be a com plete description of a world (or a restricted form of partial explanation). Gardenfors, on the other hand, is not restric tive enough. He allows E A C to be an explanation of E, for example, and this seems to us unreasonable. In ad dition, he would allow a falling barometer reading to be an explanation for a storm, thus missing out on the causal structure.
As we mentioned above, we view all explanations as causal.
We distinguish between explaining facts and explaining be liefs, but in both cases we look for the same thing in an explanation: a causal mechanism which (possibly together with some facts) is responsible for the fact observed or the beliefs adopted. By enforcing causality, AGMwe be lieve that we can avoid the problems in G!rdenfors' defini tion, while still allowing more general explanations than the
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MAP approach would allow. We remark that we are not the first to stress the role of causality in explanation. Salmon (I 984) discusses the issue at length, although the technical details of his proposal are quite different from ours.
The literature on causality is at least as large as the literature on explanation; it is well beyond the scope of this paper to develop a new theory of causality. For the purposes of the rest of this paper, we work at the propositional level (since that is essentially what the recent approaches to causality do) and assume that the causal mechanism is described by a causal structure, which we take to be a Bayesian network interpreted causally.
We believe that much of what we do is independent of the particular way we choose to model causality. In particular, we can replace the causal network by structural equations, as described in (Druzdzel and Simon 1993; Pearl1995) . We have chosen to use Bayesian networks as our representation for causality simply to make it easier to relate our approach to Pearl's approach.
In this setting, part of the agent's uncertainty concerns what the right causal mechanism is. For example, an agent may be uncertain whether smoking causes cancer or whether there is a gene that causes both a susceptibility to cancer and a susceptibility to smoking. Thus, we assume that a world is a pair ( w, C) consisting of a truth assignment w and a causal structure C. As before, an epistemic state K is a pair (W, Pr), where W is a set of worlds of this form, and Pr is a probability distribution on W. However, we assume that this epistemic state arises from a simpler description: We assume that the agent has a probability distribution Pr' on causal structures and has made some observations. Notice that a causal structure C also places a probability distribution Pre on worlds. We require that the distribution Pr be consistent with the causal mechanisms considered possible and the observations 0 in the following sense: There must be a probability distribution IY on causal mechanisms such that Pr(w, C) = Pr'(C) Prc(wiO): that is, the probability of ( w, C) is the probability of the causal mechanism C times the probability that C induces on w, given the observation. In particular, this means that if the agent considers only one causal mechanism possible, we can identify Pr with a probability on truth assignments, just as Pearl does.
We assume that the explanandum E is one of the ob servations.
This means that Pr:E has a simple form: Pr;;; (w,C) = Pr'(C) Prc(wiO-{E}). It is easy to see that this definition satisfies the postulates for contraction.
An explanation of E in epistemic state K is a conjunction X = X 1 1\ X2 consisting of a partial causal mechanism X1 (that is, a description of a causal structure; see below) and an instantiation of nodes X2 that causally precede E in Xt such that Pr(X) < l. (Yt/e defer for now the is sue of whether the explanation raises the probability of the explanandum.)
We are deliberately being vague about the language used to describe the causal mechanism, since we believe that this is an area for further research. For the purposes of this paper, we can take Xt to be simply a description of a subgraph of the causal graph (intuitively, that part of the causal graph that is relevant to explaining E, i.e., a subset of the set of paths from nodes in X2 to E).
We allow the conjunct describing the causal mechanism to be missing from the explanation if it is known. (In practice, this might mean that the system providing the explanation believes that the agent to whom the explanation is being pro vided knows the causal mechanism.) Notice that if the agent knows the causal mechanism, and thus considers only one causal mechanism possible (as is implicitly the case when a situation is described by a Bayesian network which is given a causal interpretation) , then a world can be identified with a truth assignment. In this case (ignoring the requirement that all the conjuncts in a basic explanation of E must pre cede E causally), what Pearl called an explanation would be a special case of what we are calling an explanation. However, we allow more general explanations, in that we do not require an explanation to be a truth assignment. In this sense, our framework can be viewed as generalizing Pearl's and Sbimony 's.
Our definition also borrows heavily from Glirdenfors' defi nition. We take from him the requirement that Pr( X) < 1.
His other requirement, that Pre(EIX) > Pre (E), will also play a role in our ordering of explanations. The form of the explanation-a conjunction of a (partial) causal mech anism and an instantiations of nodes-is also taken from G!irdenfors.7 Since we are working with propositional Bayesian networks, the instantiation of nodes clearly corre sponds to taking the conjunction of atomic sentences in first order logic. Giirdenfors allows disjunctions as well (since he allows singular sentences, which are Boolean combina tions of atomic sentence s). Allowing disjunctions seems to cause problems for us; we return to this issue in Section 4.3.
The (partial) causal mechanism can be viewed as a gener alization of statistical assertions. We view the requirement of the causal mechanism as a key difference between our definition and Giirdenfors '. For one thing, the causality requirement prevents E 1\ C from being an explanation of E, since E cannot precede E in the causal ordering. It also prevents a symptom from being an explanation of a disease.
We would argue that causality is what makes most of
Gardenfors examples involving statistics so compelling.
For example, consider the case of Mr. Johansson. We be lieve that the explanation "70% of those who work with asbestos develop lung cancer" involves more than just the statistical assertion. It is accepted as an explanation because we implicitly accept that there is a causal structure with an edge from a node labeled asbestos to a node labeled lung cancer (with a conditional probability table saying that the probability of lung cancer given asbestos is 0.7). And it is the lack of causality that causes us (if the reader will pardon the pun) not to accept "70% of the time that the barometer reading goes down there is a storm" as an explanation of a storm (unless we happen to believe that barometer readings have a causal influence on storms). However, the situation is different if we try to explain our beliefs to someone else. In this case, the causal structure is symmetric. The fact that I believe that there is a storm does explain my belief that the barometer reading has gone down; my belief that the barometer reading has gone down is an explanation for my belief that there is a storm. Ultimately, these beliefs should be rooted in an observation (either of the storm or the barometer).
We can readily convert a causal network describing a sit uation to a network describing an age nt's beliefs. We just reinterpret all the nodes so that a node labeled X talks about the agent's belief in X ,mora lize the graph and change all the directed edges to undirected edges. The resulting Markov network (Pearl 1988) captures the causal as well as proba bilistic dependencies between the agent 's beliefs. Note that the resulting network is no longer asymmetric . While we do not view a symptom as a cause for a disease, believing that a patient has a certain symptom might well cause us to believe that he has a disease. However, an explanation for the agent's beliefs would then be an acyclic subnetwork of this network, together with some new nodes representing the external causes of some of the beliefs. For example, an external cause for the belief that the patient has symptom d is the observation of the symptom; an external cause for the belief that David has an ear infection might be receiving that information from a doctor. We discuss this in more detail in the full paper.
ORDERING EXPLANATIONS
As we have seen in the few examples presented so fa r, and as is indeed the case in many applications, there are typi cally several competing explanations. We need to be able to compare them and choose the best. The two proposals pre sented above for ordering explanations-Giirdenfors' no tion of explanatory power and Pearl's notion of considering the probability of the explanation given the explanandum both have their merits, but neither seems quite right to us. The following example might help clarify the differences between them.
Example 4.1 Assume that we have a bag of 100 coins, 99 of which are strongly biased (9:1) towards heads and one that is just as strongly biased towards tails. We pick a coin at random and toss it. The coin lands tails.
We can nwdel this situation by using two random variables:
C (the typ e of coin) with values bh and bt (biased towards heads and biased towards tails) and R (the result of the toss), with values h and t. A priori, the probability that we picked a coin that is biased towards heads is very high; in fa ct P(C == bh) == 0.99. Af t er receiving the evidence of the coin landing tails, we find out that P(C == bhiR=t) is close to 0.92-less that the prior on C = bh but still very high.
What explanation would we accept fo r the fa ct that the coin landed tails ? Clearly, the causal structure in this situation is known: there is a causal relation between C and R, with the obvious conditional probability table described by the story. Since the causal structure is known, the allowable explanations can be identified with C = bh and C = bt.
Wh at is the re lative merit of these exp lanations?
According to Gardenfors' definition, C = bt is a much better explanation than C = bh, since Pr(R =tiC = bt) is much greater than Pr(R =tiC = bh) , where Pr is the prior probability distribution, before the outcome R = t is known.
Intuitively, C = bt has far better explanatory power because it accounts for the observation far better tha n C = bh does.
On the other hand, the explanation seems unsatisfactory, since it does not take into account the low probability that the coin biased towards tails will be picked.
According to Pearl's ordering, the best explanation of the coin landing tails is C = bh, since Pr( C =bh!R=t) is much greater than Pr( C = btiR= t).8 This explanation, although very likely itself, doesn' t seem to relieve the "cognitive dissonance" between the explanandum and the rest of our beliefs. While it may be the correct dia g nosis of the situa tion, it doesn't seem right to call it an explanation. The fact that the potential explanation is less probable a posteriori than a priori should at least cause some suspicion.
Notice that by Bayes' rule,
X Pr(C = bh).
The term P r(���:J bh) is what we called the explanatory power of C = bh with respect to R= t. Thus, the degree to which C = bh is an explanation of R = t according to Pearl is precisely the product of EP( C =bh, R= t) and the prior probability of C = bh. Thus, we can see the precise sense in which Pearl 's definition takes into account the prior whereas Gardenfors' does not.
Although the two defi nitions disagree in thi s example, there are many situations of interest in which they agree (which is, perhaps, why both have seemed to be acceptable definitions of the notion of explanation) . In particular, they agree in situations where the prior probability of all explanations is the same (or almost the same). Thus, if the user has no particular predisposition to accept one explanation over another, both approaches will view the same explanation as most favorable .9"
Since we cannot always count on the prior of all explana tions being equal, we would like an ordering on explana tions that takes into account both the explanatory power and the prior. Our ordering also avoids the problem in Gardenfors' or dering that adding irrelevant conjuncts results in an equally preferred explanation. For example, if X is an explanation of E then X 1\ Y (for all Y conditionally independent of E given the epistemic state) would be considered a worse explanation than X in our ordering since their explanatory powers are the same and X 's prior is higher.
If we add a conjunct that is not completely irrelevant, then our approach forces the agent to decide between more spe cific explanations that have higher explanatory power, and less specifi c explanations, that have a higher prior. For example, suppose we want to understand why a somewhat she ltered part of the lawn is wet. One possible explanation is that it rained last night, but rain does not always cause that part of the lawn to get wet. A better explanation might be that it was raining and very windy. The combination of rain and wind has better explanatory power than rain alone, but a lower prior. According to our ordering, this makes the two explanations incomparable. This does not seem so unreasonable in this case. We would expect a useful explanatory system to point out both possible explanations, and let the user decide if the gain from the extra explanatory power of wind is sufficiently high to meri t the lower prior.
Note that if we multiply the explanatory power of the ex planation by its prior, we will always prefer the expla nation "rain". To see thi s, note that for any explanation X, the product of the explanatory power and the prior is
Pr:E (XJE). Since clearly Pr:E (XJE) � Pr:E (X A YIE), the simpler explanation is preferred. This is a case where multiplication causes a loss of useful information.
DEALING WlTH DISJUNCTIONS
As we have defi ned it, an explanation is a conjunction of a partial causal mechanism together with an instantiation of nodes. We have not allowed disjunctions. Disallow ing disjunctions of causal mechanisms seems reasonable. It is consistent with the intuition that "you have cancer either because you smoke or because you have a genetic predisposition to cancer" is viewed as a disjunction of two explanations, not one explanation which has the form of a disjunction. We suspect that it is for similar reasons that
Gardenfors disallowed the disjunction of statistical asser tions in his defi nition.
On the swface, it may seem less reasonable to disallow the disjunction of instantiations of nodes. Certainly it is straightforward to modify our definition so as to allow them, and doing so would be more in keeping with Glirdenfors' allowing singular sentences. However, notice that allowing the disjunction of instantiations bas the effect of allowing disjunctions of causal mechanisms.
Consider a case in which we ask for an explanation of huge forest fires recently occurring in California. One possible explanation is that the fire prevention caused the brush to overgrow, another that the tourists often leave campfires unattended. Both these explanations are very plausible (and so is their conjunction) . Suppose the agent considers only one causal network possible , and it contains both of these mechanisms. Thus, by allowing the explanation "either some tourists left their campfire unattended or the brush was overgrown", we are effectively allowing a disjunction of causal mechanisms. This example suggests that we may want to make a distinction between what appear to be two different causal mechanisms co-existing within the same causal structure (perhaps using the te chniques discussed by Druzdzel and Simon (1993) ). This is an area for future research.
On the other hand, there are cases where allowing disjunc tions seems useful. For example, consider a situation in which we have four coins, Ct , C2 , C3 , and C4 , where Ct and c2 . are biased towards heads and c3 and c4 are bi ased toward tails. We pick one coin at random and toss it three times. The coin lands heads every time. The ob vious explanation for this fact is that we picked one of the coins biased towards heads, that is, either cl or c2 .
And, indeed, our ordering would prefer the explanation X 1 =det ( C = CJ ) v ( C = C2) to either of the explanations C = C1 or C = C2 , assuming that both C1 and C2 had the same bias.
By way of contrast, the explanation X2 if we compare the explanation X to a disjunctive explanation X V Y by multiplying the explanatory power times the prior, then we will always prefer XV Y to X, for the same reasons as given earlier for preferring X to X 1\ Y.
way for deciding when to add such variables.
Shimony's work can be viewed as an attempt to provide principles as to when to consider disjunctive explanations.
The partial explanations of (Shimony 1991) are sets of worlds where the truth values of some primitive propo sitions are fixed, while the rest can be arbitrary. The sets of partial explanations of (Shimony 1993) correspond to more general sets of worlds, but there are still signifi cant restric tions. For example, the disjunctive explanation must corre spond to a node already in the network and the probability of the explanandum must be the same for every disjunct in the disjunctive explanation. The latter restriction is quite severe . In our coin example, if the coins biased towards heads have different biases, Shimony 's approach would not allow us to consider the explanation xl ' "we picked a coin biased towards heads". Of course , we can easily loosen this restriction to allow disjunctions where the conditional probabilities are almost the same . However, it see ms to us that we want more than just similar conditional probabili ties here . We only want to allow disjunctions if the causal mechanism for each disjunct is the same .
To be fa ir, Shimony uses his restrictions to allow him to find good explanations algorithmically. It is not clear whether there are also philosophical reasons to restrict them in this way. We hope to explore both the algorithmic and founda tional issues in future work.
CONCLUSIONS
We feel that the contribution of this paper is twofold: First, we present a critique of two important approaches to ex planation; second, we outline a sketch of a novel approach that tries to take into account the best fe atures of both, and combine them with a notion of causality.
Our approach clearly needs to be fieshed out. Some areas for future research include:
• Obviously, much of the effort will involve research in causality. for reasoning about causality, that allowed first-order reasoning and temporal constructs.
• As we have observed, our approach, which provides only a partial ordering on explanations, seems too weak. While it is not clear that we want to have a total order, it does seem that we want to allow more explanations to be comparable than is the case accord ing to our ordering. This is particularly the case if we allow disjunctive explanations.
• A natural extension would be to apply our definition to countetfactuals. After all, humans seem to have no problem with ex plaining hypothetical facts. We believe that our basic framework should be able to handle thi s, although per haps we may need to use structural equations and the interpretation of countetfactuals given by Balke and Pearl (1994) .
• As we said earlier, given that our goal is to have the system provide an explanation that is useful to a user, it would be important to model the user's knowledge state and adjust explanations accordingly. The work of Suermondt (1992) is relevant in this regard. He also puts the emphasis on explaining beliefs (or, specifi cally, probability distribution over the node of inter est) adopted by the system as a result of receiving some observation. His goal is to fi nd a small subset of ev idence responsible for this change and the links most influential in transmitting it. In our context, we can understand Suermondt as considering a system which has full knowledge of the domain (characterized by a Bayes Net together with all the conditional probability tables) and knows the values of some variables, trying to explain its beliefs to a user with no (or minimal) knowledge. Thus, for him, an explanation amounts to finding a "small" set of instantiations of variables (i.e., a partial truth assignment) and a 'small" partial causal mechanism that will raise the posterior probability of the observations.
Given the importance of explanation, we believe that these questions represent fruitful lines for further research.
